Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, W. David Ross and Alain Badiou

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76 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
In ontology, logic dominated language, until logic was mathematized [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Philosophy aims to reveal the grandeur of mathematics [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
The female body, when taken in its entirety, is the Phallus itself [Badiou]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Philosophy has been relieved of physics, cosmology, politics, and now must give up ontology [Badiou]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Consensus is the enemy of thought [Badiou]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
There is 'transivity' iff membership ∈ also means inclusion ⊆ [Badiou]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The axiom of choice must accept an indeterminate, indefinable, unconstructible set [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Topos theory explains the plurality of possible logics [Badiou]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a mathematical account of a universe of relations [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
In mathematics, if a problem can be formulated, it will eventually be solved [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers are for measuring and for calculating (and the two must be consistent) [Badiou]
There is no single unified definition of number [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Each type of number has its own characteristic procedure of introduction [Badiou]
Must we accept numbers as existing when they no longer consist of units? [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Mathematics shows that thinking is not confined to the finite [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The undecidability of the Continuum Hypothesis may have ruined or fragmented set theory [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
If mathematics is a logic of the possible, then questions of existence are not intrinsic to it [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Platonists like axioms and decisions, Aristotelians like definitions, possibilities and logic [Badiou]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logic is definitional, but real mathematics is axiomatic [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Mathematics inscribes being as such [Badiou]
There is no Being as a whole, because there is no set of all sets [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Existence is Being itself, but only as our thought decides it [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The modern view of Being comes when we reject numbers as merely successions of One [Badiou]
The primitive name of Being is the empty set; in a sense, only the empty set 'is' [Badiou]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
It is of the essence of being to appear [Badiou]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontology is (and always has been) Cantorian mathematics [Badiou]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Identical objects must have identical value [Ross]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
We must either assert or deny any single predicate of any single subject [Badiou]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
All great poetry is engaged in rivalry with mathematics [Badiou]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross]
The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J]
The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross]
The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross]
All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross]
The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross]
If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross]
In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross]
Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross]
Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross]
Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross]
No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross]
Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross]
Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG]
We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
For Enlightenment philosophers, God was no longer involved in politics [Badiou]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The God of religion results from an encounter, not from a proof [Badiou]