Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Buridan, Will Sommers and Jonathan Glover

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67 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
F(x) walked into a bar. The barman said.. [Sommers,W]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
Sartre to Waitress: Coffee with no cream, please... [Sommers,W]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Said Plato: 'The things that we feel... [Sommers,W]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
Barman to Descartes: Would you like another drink?... [Sommers,W]
There was a young student called Fred... [Sommers,W]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
A philosopher and his wife are out for a drive... [Sommers,W]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Dear Sir, Your astonishment's odd.... [Sommers,W]
There once was a man who said: 'God... [Sommers,W]
..But if he's a student of Berkeley... [Sommers,W]
The philosopher Berkeley once said.. [Sommers,W]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
"My dog's got synaesthesia." How does he smell? ..... [Sommers,W]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
A toper who spies in the distance... [Sommers,W]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
There once was a man who said 'Damn!... [Sommers,W]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
How do behaviourists greet each other? [Sommers,W]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover]
It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover]
Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover]
The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
'If you're aristocratic,' said Nietzsche... [Sommers,W]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Why do anarchists drink herbal tea? [Sommers,W]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover]
If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 2. Moral rights
Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover]
You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover]
Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover]
What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover]
The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover]
Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover]
Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover]
Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover]
The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover]
How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover]
If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover]
Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover]
If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover]
If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover]
Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover]
If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover]
Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover]
It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Cries the maid: 'You must marry me Hume!'... [Sommers,W]
Causation - we all thought we knew it/ Till Hume came along and saw through it/…. [Sommers,W]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / c. Idealist time
The barman called 'Time!', and Augustine said..... [Sommers,W]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
The past, present and future walked into a bar.... [Sommers,W]