59 ideas
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
527 | Everything exists which anyone perceives [Metrodorus of Chios] |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |