Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Charvet, Wilfrid Hodges and Harry G. Frankfurt

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66 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The idea that groups of concepts could be 'implicitly defined' was abandoned [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is the study of sound argument, or of certain artificial languages (or applying the latter to the former) [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Since first-order languages are complete, |= and |- have the same meaning [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
|= in model-theory means 'logical consequence' - it holds in all models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
A formula needs an 'interpretation' of its constants, and a 'valuation' of its variables [Hodges,W]
There are three different standard presentations of semantics [Hodges,W]
I |= φ means that the formula φ is true in the interpretation I [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
|= should be read as 'is a model for' or 'satisfies' [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory studies formal or natural language-interpretation using set-theory [Hodges,W]
A 'structure' is an interpretation specifying objects and classes of quantification [Hodges,W]
Models in model theory are structures, not sets of descriptions [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Down Löwenheim-Skolem: if a countable language has a consistent theory, that has a countable model [Hodges,W]
Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if infinite models, then arbitrarily large models [Hodges,W]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
If a first-order theory entails a sentence, there is a finite subset of the theory which entails it [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
First-order logic can't discriminate between one infinite cardinal and another [Hodges,W]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
A 'set' is a mathematically well-behaved class [Hodges,W]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
Persons are distinguished by a capacity for second-order desires [Frankfurt]
A person essentially has second-order volitions, and not just second-order desires [Frankfurt]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Free will is the capacity to choose what sort of will you have [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the effective desire which actually leads to an action [Frankfurt]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Freedom of action needs the agent to identify with their reason for acting [Frankfurt, by Wilson/Schpall]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
A 'wanton' is not a person, because they lack second-order volitions [Frankfurt]
A person may be morally responsible without free will [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet]
Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet]
Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet]
Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / f. Multiculturalism
Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet]
Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet]
First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet]
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet]
Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet]
The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet]
From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet]
Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet]
The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 3. Welfare provision
Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet]