Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Dewey, Graeme Forbes and Daniel M. Mittag

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


55 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Philosophy is the study and criticsm of cultural beliefs, to achieve new possibilities [Dewey]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
Liberalism should improve the system, and not just ameliorate it [Dewey]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G]
Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Knowledge is either the product of competent enquiry, or it is meaningless [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We want certainty in order achieve secure results for action [Dewey]
The quest for certainty aims for peace, and avoidance of the stress of action [Dewey]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
No belief can be so settled that it is not subject to further inquiry [Dewey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag]
Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag]
Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Mind is never isolated, but only exists in its interactions [Dewey]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Habits constitute the self [Dewey]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Dewey argued long before Wittgenstein that there could not seriously be a private language [Dewey, by Orenstein]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey]
Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals aim to allow individuals to realise their capacities [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
The things in civilisation we prize are the products of other members of our community [Dewey]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
'God' is an imaginative unity of ideal values [Dewey]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
We should try attaching the intensity of religious devotion to intelligent social action [Dewey]
Religions are so shockingly diverse that they have no common element [Dewey]