Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Duns Scotus, Rahulabhadra and John Hawthorne

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Theory vanishes when one has obtained wisdom [Rahulabhadra]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne]
If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne]
Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
'Unity' is a particularly difficult word, because things can have hidden unity [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / a. Scattered objects
If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Matter and form give true unity; subject and accident is just unity 'per accidens' [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]