51 ideas
| 22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
| 22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
| 22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
| 10702 | Set theory's three roles: taming the infinite, subject-matter of mathematics, and modes of reasoning [Potter] |
| 10713 | Usually the only reason given for accepting the empty set is convenience [Potter] |
| 13044 | Infinity: There is at least one limit level [Potter] |
| 10708 | Nowadays we derive our conception of collections from the dependence between them [Potter] |
| 13546 | The 'limitation of size' principles say whether properties collectivise depends on the number of objects [Potter] |
| 10707 | Mereology elides the distinction between the cards in a pack and the suits [Potter] |
| 10704 | We can formalize second-order formation rules, but not inference rules [Potter] |
| 22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
| 22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
| 10703 | Supposing axioms (rather than accepting them) give truths, but they are conditional [Potter] |
| 22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
| 10712 | If set theory didn't found mathematics, it is still needed to count infinite sets [Potter] |
| 17882 | It is remarkable that all natural number arithmetic derives from just the Peano Axioms [Potter] |
| 22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
| 22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
| 22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
| 17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
| 17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
| 13043 | A relation is a set consisting entirely of ordered pairs [Potter] |
| 22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
| 13042 | If dependence is well-founded, with no infinite backward chains, this implies substances [Potter] |
| 13041 | Collections have fixed members, but fusions can be carved in innumerable ways [Potter] |
| 17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
| 17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
| 17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
| 10709 | Priority is a modality, arising from collections and members [Potter] |
| 22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
| 22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
| 17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
| 22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
| 17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
| 22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
| 22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
| 22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
| 22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |
| 5126 | A carelessly thrown brick is condemned much more if it hits someone [Smith,A, by Harman] |
| 20991 | People prepare our dinner from their own self-interest, not from humanity [Smith,A] |
| 20680 | Selfish profit-seeking increases collective wealth, so greed is good, and egoism is altruism [Smith,A, by Harari] |
| 17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
| 17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
| 17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
| 17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
| 17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
| 17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
| 17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
| 17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
| 17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
| 17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |