36 ideas
18369 | There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham] |
12442 | 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni] |
19318 | A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham] |
19319 | If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham] |
19320 | If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham] |
12439 | Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni] |
12437 | Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni] |
19315 | In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham] |
12446 | Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni] |
19317 | An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham] |
12447 | That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni] |
12445 | If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni] |
19322 | Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham] |
12449 | Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni] |
12440 | If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni] |
12438 | In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni] |
12441 | We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni] |
17377 | All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré] |
17376 | We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré] |
12448 | Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni] |
17390 | Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré] |
17389 | A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré] |
17388 | It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré] |
17374 | The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré] |
17378 | Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré] |
17381 | Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré] |
17385 | Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré] |
17375 | Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré] |
17379 | Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré] |
17384 | Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré] |
17387 | Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré] |
17382 | Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré] |
17380 | Wales may count as fish [Dupré] |
12450 | The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni] |
17383 | Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré] |
17386 | The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré] |