Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Dupré, Solon and Keith Hossack

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47 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice is a non-logical principle of set-theory [Hossack]
The Axiom of Choice guarantees a one-one correspondence from sets to ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe we reduce sets to ordinals, rather than the other way round [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
Extensional mereology needs two definitions and two axioms [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Plural definite descriptions pick out the largest class of things that fit the description [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural reference will refer to complex facts without postulating complex things [Hossack]
Plural reference is just an abbreviation when properties are distributive, but not otherwise [Hossack]
A plural comprehension principle says there are some things one of which meets some condition [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / d. Russell's paradox
Plural language can discuss without inconsistency things that are not members of themselves [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The theory of the transfinite needs the ordinal numbers [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
I take the real numbers to be just lengths [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / e. Peano arithmetic 2nd-order
A plural language gives a single comprehensive induction axiom for arithmetic [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
In arithmetic singularists need sets as the instantiator of numeric properties [Hossack]
Set theory is the science of infinity [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We are committed to a 'group' of children, if they are sitting in a circle [Hossack]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
All descriptive language is classificatory [Dupré]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
We should aim for a classification which tells us as much as possible about the object [Dupré]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Complex particulars are either masses, or composites, or sets [Hossack]
The relation of composition is indispensable to the part-whole relation for individuals [Hossack]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Leibniz's Law argues against atomism - water is wet, unlike water molecules [Hossack]
The fusion of five rectangles can decompose into more than five parts that are rectangles [Hossack]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Natural kinds don't need essentialism to be explanatory [Dupré]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
A species might have its essential genetic mechanism replaced by a new one [Dupré]
It seems that species lack essential properties, so they can't be natural kinds [Dupré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
The possibility of prediction rests on determinism [Dupré]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A thought can refer to many things, but only predicate a universal and affirm a state of affairs [Hossack]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
Presumably molecular structure seems important because we never have the Twin Earth experience [Dupré]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / c. Deterrence of crime
The greatest deterrence for injustice is if uninjured parties feel as much indignation as those who are injured [Solon, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Phylogenetics involves history, and cladism rests species on splits in lineage [Dupré]
Kinds don't do anything (including evolve) because they are abstract [Dupré]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Natural kinds are decided entirely by the intentions of our classification [Dupré]
Borders between species are much less clear in vegetables than among animals [Dupré]
Even atoms of an element differ, in the energy levels of their electrons [Dupré]
Ecologists favour classifying by niche, even though that can clash with genealogy [Dupré]
Cooks, unlike scientists, distinguish garlic from onions [Dupré]
Wales may count as fish [Dupré]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
We could ignore space, and just talk of the shape of matter [Hossack]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Species are the lowest-level classification in biology [Dupré]
The theory of evolution is mainly about species [Dupré]