40 ideas
19735 | Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco] |
13520 | A 'tautology' must include connectives [Wolf,RS] |
13524 | Deduction Theorem: T∪{P}|-Q, then T|-(P→Q), which justifies Conditional Proof [Wolf,RS] |
13521 | Universal Specification: ∀xP(x) implies P(t). True for all? Then true for an instance [Wolf,RS] |
13522 | Universal Generalization: If we prove P(x) with no special assumptions, we can conclude ∀xP(x) [Wolf,RS] |
13523 | Existential Generalization (or 'proof by example'): if we can say P(t), then we can say something is P [Wolf,RS] |
10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
13529 | Empty Set: ∃x∀y ¬(y∈x). The unique empty set exists [Wolf,RS] |
10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
13526 | Comprehension Axiom: if a collection is clearly specified, it is a set [Wolf,RS] |
10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
13534 | In first-order logic syntactic and semantic consequence (|- and |=) nicely coincide [Wolf,RS] |
13535 | First-order logic is weakly complete (valid sentences are provable); we can't prove every sentence or its negation [Wolf,RS] |
10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
13519 | Model theory uses sets to show that mathematical deduction fits mathematical truth [Wolf,RS] |
13531 | Model theory reveals the structures of mathematics [Wolf,RS] |
13532 | Model theory 'structures' have a 'universe', some 'relations', some 'functions', and some 'constants' [Wolf,RS] |
13533 | First-order model theory rests on completeness, compactness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem-Tarski theorem [Wolf,RS] |
10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
13537 | An 'isomorphism' is a bijection that preserves all structural components [Wolf,RS] |
13539 | The LST Theorem is a serious limitation of first-order logic [Wolf,RS] |
13538 | If a theory is complete, only a more powerful language can strengthen it [Wolf,RS] |
13525 | Most deductive logic (unlike ordinary reasoning) is 'monotonic' - we don't retract after new givens [Wolf,RS] |
13530 | An ordinal is an equivalence class of well-orderings, or a transitive set whose members are transitive [Wolf,RS] |
10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
13518 | Modern mathematics has unified all of its objects within set theory [Wolf,RS] |
19734 | If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco] |
19733 | Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco] |