38 ideas
| 8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
| 15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
| 15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
| 15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
| 14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
| 15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
| 15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
| 8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
| 14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
| 8970 | Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne] |
| 14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
| 19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
| 19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
| 19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
| 8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
| 8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
| 22457 | If the aim is good outcomes, why are killings worse than deaths? [Scheffler, by Foot] |
| 15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
| 8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
| 8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
| 8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |
| 15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |
| 14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |