89 ideas
3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
20146 | 'Luck' is the unpredictable and inexplicable intersection of causal chains [Kekes] |
3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
23101 | Intuitions don't prove things; they just receptivity to interpretations [Kekes] |
3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
20169 | An action may be intended under one description, but not under another [Kekes] |
20149 | To control our actions better, make them result from our attitudes, not from circumstances [Kekes] |
23086 | Liberals say we are only responsible for fully autonomous actions [Kekes] |
23100 | Collective responsibility conflicts with responsibility's requirement of authonomy [Kekes] |
19738 | Values are an attempt to achieve well-being by bringing contingencies under control [Kekes] |
20145 | Values help us to control life, by connecting it to what is stable and manageable [Kekes] |
23087 | Much human evil is not autonomous, so moral responsibility need not be autonomous [Kekes] |
23089 | Evil people may not be autonomously aware, if they misjudge the situation [Kekes] |
23093 | Moral and causal responsibility are not clearly distinct [Kekes] |
23094 | Ought implies can means moral responsibility needs autonomy [Kekes] |
23095 | Why should moral responsibility depend on autonomy, rather than social role or experience? [Kekes] |
23096 | Morality should aim to prevent all evil actions, not just autonomous ones [Kekes] |
23098 | Effects show the existence of moral responsibility, and mental states show the degree [Kekes] |
20170 | Responsibility is unprovoked foreseeable harm, against society, arising from vicious character [Kekes] |
20165 | Reason and morality do not coincide; immorality can be reasonable, with an ideology [Kekes] |
20171 | Practical reason is not universal and impersonal, because it depends on what success is [Kekes] |
20175 | If morality has to be rational, then moral conflicts need us to be irrational and immoral [Kekes] |
23090 | Liberals assume people are naturally free, equal, rational, and morally good [Kekes] |
20174 | Relativists say all values are relative; pluralists concede much of that, but not 'human' values [Kekes] |
20156 | We are bound to regret some values we never aspired to [Kekes] |
20150 | There are far more values than we can pursue, so they are optional possibilities [Kekes] |
20158 | Innumerable values arise for us, from our humanity, our culture, and our individuality [Kekes] |
20159 | Cultural values are interpretations of humanity, conduct, institutions, and evaluations [Kekes] |
20161 | The big value problems are evil (humanity), disenchantment (cultures), and boredom (individuals) [Kekes] |
20152 | Unconditional commitments are our most basic convictions, saying what must never be done [Kekes] |
20153 | Doing the unthinkable damages ourselves, so it is more basic than any value [Kekes] |
20151 | Our attitudes include what possibilities we value, and also what is allowable, and unthinkable [Kekes] |
23117 | Love should be partial, and discriminate in favour of its object [Kekes] |
23119 | Sentimental love distorts its object [Kekes] |
23088 | Evil is not deviation from the good, any more than good is a deviation from evil [Kekes] |
20162 | Evil isn't explained by nature, by monsters, by uncharacteristic actions, or by society [Kekes] |
23097 | What matters for morality is the effects of action, not the psychological causes [Kekes] |
20154 | Control is the key to well-being [Kekes] |
20157 | Well-being needs correct attitudes and well-ordered commitments to local values [Kekes] |
23099 | It is said that if an agent is not autonomous then their evil actions don't reflect on their character [Kekes] |
23118 | Awareness of others' suffering doesn't create an obligation to help [Kekes] |
20172 | Boredom destroys our ability to evaluate [Kekes] |
20173 | Boredom is apathy and restlessness, yearning for something interesting [Kekes] |
20155 | Society is alienating if it lacks our values, and its values repel us [Kekes] |
23109 | The veil of ignorance is only needed because people have bad motivations [Kekes] |
23114 | The chief function of the state is to arbitrate between contending visions of the good life [Kekes] |
20163 | Ideologies have beliefs about reality, ideals, a gap with actuality, and a program [Kekes] |
20164 | The ideal of an ideology is embodied in a text, a role model, a law of history, a dream of the past... [Kekes] |
23116 | Citizenship is easier than parenthood [Kekes] |
23103 | Power is meant to be confined to representatives, and subsequent delegation [Kekes] |
23107 | Prosperity is a higher social virtue than justice [Kekes] |
23081 | Liberal basics are pluralism, freedom, rights, equality, and distributive justice - for autonomy [Kekes] |
23085 | The key liberal values are explained by the one core value, which is autonomy [Kekes] |
23092 | Agents have little control over the capacities needed for liberal autonomy [Kekes] |
23102 | Liberals are egalitarians, but in varying degrees [Kekes] |
23084 | Are egalitarians too coercive, or not egalitarian enough, or lax over morality? [Kekes] |
23082 | Liberal distribution cares more about recipients than donors [Kekes] |
23079 | Liberal justice ignores desert, which is the essence of justice [Kekes] |
23091 | Why do liberals not see a much wider range of values as basic? [Kekes] |
23112 | Liberals ignore contingency, and think people are good and equal, and institutions cause evil [Kekes] |
23106 | To rectify the undeserved equality, we should give men longer and women shorter lives [Kekes] |
23121 | It is just a fact that some people are morally better than others [Kekes] |
23105 | It is not deplorable that billionaires have more than millionaires [Kekes] |
23120 | The problem is basic insufficiency of resources, not their inequality [Kekes] |
20148 | Equal distribution is no good in a shortage, because there might be no one satisfied [Kekes] |
23108 | Justice combines consistency and desert; treat likes alike, judging likeness by desert [Kekes] |
23083 | Liberal welfare focuses on need rather than desert [Kekes] |
23113 | Sexual morality doesn't require monogamy, but it needs a group of sensible regulations [Kekes] |