72 ideas
5333 | Philosophy needs wisdom about who we are, as well as how we ought to be [Flanagan] |
5334 | We resist science partly because it can't provide ethical wisdom [Flanagan] |
9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
5340 | Explanation does not entail prediction [Flanagan] |
5346 | In the 17th century a collisionlike view of causation made mental causation implausible [Flanagan] |
21833 | Research suggest that we overrate conscious experience [Flanagan] |
5341 | Only you can have your subjective experiences because only you are hooked up to your nervous system [Flanagan] |
5351 | We only have a sense of our self as continuous, not as exactly the same [Flanagan] |
5353 | The self is an abstraction which magnifies important aspects of autobiography [Flanagan] |
5354 | We are not born with a self; we develop a self through living [Flanagan] |
5349 | For Buddhists a fixed self is a morally dangerous illusion [Flanagan] |
5338 | Normal free will claims control of what I do, but a stronger view claims control of thought and feeling [Flanagan] |
5344 | Free will is held to give us a whole list of desirable capacities for living [Flanagan] |
5332 | People believe they have free will that circumvents natural law, but only an incorporeal mind could do this [Flanagan] |
5345 | We only think of ourselves as having free will because we first thought of God that way [Flanagan] |
5343 | People largely came to believe in dualism because it made human agents free [Flanagan] |
5347 | Behaviourism notoriously has nothing to say about mental causation [Flanagan] |
5339 | Cars and bodies obey principles of causation, without us knowing any 'strict laws' about them [Flanagan] |
21834 | Sensations may be identical to brain events, but complex mental events don't seem to be [Flanagan] |
5342 | Physicalism doesn't deny that the essence of an experience is more than its neural realiser [Flanagan] |
5335 | Emotions are usually very apt, rather than being non-rational and fickle [Flanagan] |
23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
5348 | Intellectualism admires the 'principled actor', non-intellectualism admires the 'good character' [Flanagan] |
5355 | Cognitivists think morals are discovered by reason [Flanagan] |
23110 | Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls] |
21837 | Morality is normative because it identifies best practices among the normal practices [Flanagan] |
5336 | Ethics is the science of the conditions that lead to human flourishing [Flanagan] |
21830 | For Darwinians, altruism is either contracts or genetics [Flanagan] |
15676 | Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson] |
21835 | We need Eudaimonics - the empirical study of how we should flourish [Flanagan] |
4123 | A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B] |
21051 | Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls] |
3279 | Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel] |
22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
21137 | Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten] |
3280 | Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls] |
20552 | The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift] |
18636 | Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls] |
18631 | All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls] |
21119 | Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls] |
20538 | Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls] |
9277 | Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls] |
23420 | In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls] |
21831 | Alienation is not finding what one wants, or being unable to achieve it [Flanagan] |
20527 | Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls] |
21018 | The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum] |
21041 | Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls] |
23583 | If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls] |
5350 | The Hindu doctrine of reincarnation only appeared in the eighth century CE [Flanagan] |
21832 | Buddhists reject God and the self, and accept suffering as key, and liberation through wisdom [Flanagan] |
5352 | The idea of the soul gets some support from the scientific belief in essential 'natural kinds' [Flanagan] |