Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Rawls, Richard Hooker and Sydney Shoemaker

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79 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker]
We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker]
Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis]
A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker]
'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker]
The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker]
Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker]
Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker]
If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker]
The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker]
Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker]
Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker]
Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls]
The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum]
Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker]
If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe]
If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker]