84 ideas
15801 | Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm] |
23728 | Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M] |
15802 | I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm] |
23744 | Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M] |
15832 | Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm] |
15829 | The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm] |
15809 | A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm] |
15828 | I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm] |
13120 | Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff] |
15827 | Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm] |
15830 | Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm] |
15804 | If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm] |
15810 | Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm] |
15805 | Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm] |
15807 | A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm] |
15814 | A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm] |
12852 | If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons] |
15808 | A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm] |
11966 | If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm] |
12851 | Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons] |
15806 | The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm] |
15826 | There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm] |
11965 | Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm] |
19569 | We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig] |
15819 | Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm] |
15816 | 'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm] |
15817 | If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm] |
15818 | So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm] |
8790 | The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm] |
15831 | Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm] |
15811 | I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm] |
15815 | Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm] |
15813 | People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm] |
15803 | Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm] |
3444 | If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm] |
3446 | For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm] |
9268 | If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm] |
15821 | Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm] |
23743 | Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M] |
20062 | If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm] |
20054 | There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm] |
23724 | A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M] |
23736 | A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M] |
23723 | In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M] |
23735 | Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M] |
23738 | Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M] |
23742 | If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M] |
23746 | Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M] |
23739 | Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M] |
23733 | Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M] |
23740 | Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M] |
23745 | We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M] |
3442 | Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm] |
3443 | Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm] |
15824 | There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm] |
23731 | 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M] |
23732 | A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M] |
23729 | Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M] |
23730 | 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M] |
23110 | Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls] |
23727 | Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M] |
23741 | Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M] |
15676 | Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson] |
4123 | A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B] |
21051 | Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls] |
3279 | Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel] |
22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
21137 | Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten] |
3280 | Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls] |
20552 | The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift] |
18636 | Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls] |
18631 | All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls] |
21119 | Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls] |
20538 | Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls] |
9277 | Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls] |
23420 | In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls] |
20527 | Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls] |
21018 | The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum] |
21041 | Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls] |
23583 | If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls] |
15822 | The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm] |
15823 | Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm] |
3445 | Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm] |
15820 | A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm] |