Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Rawls, Tim Maudlin and Peter Geach

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77 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 7. Against Metaphysics
Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin]
The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / c. Against mathematical empiricism
Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin]
Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin]
If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin]
The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach]
Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]
The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach]
Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls]
The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum]
Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin]
We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin]
The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin]
If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin]
If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin]
Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin]
Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin]