77 ideas
16241 | The metaphysics of nature should focus on physics [Maudlin] |
16257 | Kant survives in seeing metaphysics as analysing our conceptual system, which is a priori [Maudlin] |
16276 | Wide metaphysical possibility may reduce metaphysics to analysis of fantasies [Maudlin] |
16244 | If the universe is profligate, the Razor leads us astray [Maudlin] |
16255 | The Razor rightly prefers one cause of multiple events to coincidences of causes [Maudlin] |
12154 | Are 'word token' and 'word type' different sorts of countable objects, or two ways of counting? [Geach, by Perry] |
10735 | Abstraction from objects won't reveal an operation's being performed 'so many times' [Geach] |
16243 | The Humean view is wrong; laws and direction of time are primitive, and atoms are decided by physics [Maudlin] |
16271 | Lewis says it supervenes on the Mosaic, but actually thinks the Mosaic is all there is [Maudlin] |
16273 | If the Humean Mosaic is ontological bedrock, there can be no explanation of its structure [Maudlin] |
16275 | The 'spinning disc' is just impossible, because there cannot be 'homogeneous matter' [Maudlin] |
16258 | To get an ontology from ontological commitment, just add that some theory is actually true [Maudlin] |
16259 | Naïve translation from natural to formal language can hide or multiply the ontology [Maudlin] |
16253 | A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect [Maudlin] |
8780 | Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach] |
16263 | Fundamental physics seems to suggest there are no such things as properties [Maudlin] |
16260 | Existence of universals may just be decided by acceptance, or not, of second-order logic [Maudlin] |
8969 | We should abandon absolute identity, confining it to within some category [Geach, by Hawthorne] |
16075 | Denial of absolute identity has drastic implications for logic, semantics and set theory [Wasserman on Geach] |
12152 | Identity is relative. One must not say things are 'the same', but 'the same A as' [Geach] |
16073 | Leibniz's Law is incomplete, since it includes a non-relativized identity predicate [Geach, by Wasserman] |
11910 | Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach] |
16277 | Logically impossible is metaphysically impossible, but logically possible is not metaphysically possible [Maudlin] |
16249 | A counterfactual antecedent commands the redescription of a selected moment [Maudlin] |
16254 | Induction leaps into the unknown, but usually lands safely [Maudlin] |
16245 | Laws should help explain the things they govern, or that manifest them [Maudlin] |
8775 | A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach] |
8776 | We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach] |
10732 | If concepts are just recognitional, then general judgements would be impossible [Geach] |
2567 | You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach] |
2568 | Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach] |
8781 | The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach] |
10731 | For abstractionists, concepts are capacities to recognise recurrent features of the world [Geach] |
8769 | If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach] |
8770 | 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach] |
8771 | 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach] |
8772 | We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach] |
8773 | Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach] |
8774 | The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach] |
8778 | Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach] |
8777 | If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach] |
8779 | We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach] |
10733 | The abstractionist cannot explain 'some' and 'not' [Geach] |
10734 | Only a judgement can distinguish 'striking' from 'being struck' [Geach] |
23110 | Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls] |
22489 | 'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot] |
15676 | Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson] |
4123 | A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B] |
21051 | Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls] |
3279 | Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel] |
22406 | The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart] |
21137 | Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten] |
3280 | Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls] |
20552 | The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift] |
18636 | Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls] |
18631 | All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls] |
21119 | Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls] |
20538 | Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls] |
9277 | Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls] |
23420 | In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls] |
20527 | Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls] |
21018 | The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum] |
21041 | Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls] |
23583 | If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls] |
16248 | Evaluating counterfactuals involves context and interests [Maudlin] |
16250 | We don't pick a similar world from many - we construct one possibility from the description [Maudlin] |
16268 | The counterfactual is ruined if some other cause steps in when the antecedent fails [Maudlin] |
16267 | If we know the cause of an event, we seem to assent to the counterfactual [Maudlin] |
16269 | If the effect hadn't occurred the cause wouldn't have happened, so counterfactuals are two-way [Maudlin] |
16247 | Laws are primitive, so two indiscernible worlds could have the same laws [Maudlin] |
16272 | Fundamental laws say how nature will, or might, evolve from some initial state [Maudlin] |
16242 | Laws of nature are ontological bedrock, and beyond analysis [Maudlin] |
16251 | 'Humans with prime house numbers are mortal' is not a law, because not a natural kind [Maudlin] |
16270 | If laws are just regularities, then there have to be laws [Maudlin] |
16264 | I believe the passing of time is a fundamental fact about the world [Maudlin] |
16265 | If time passes, presumably it passes at one second per second [Maudlin] |
16266 | There is one ordered B series, but an infinitude of A series, depending on when the present is [Maudlin] |