Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for John Rawls, Werner Heisenberg and David Liggins

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49 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / b. Form as principle
Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
You can only explain the qualities of large objects using entities which lack those qualities [Heisenberg]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Human injustice is not a permanent feature of communities [Rawls]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Rawls defends the priority of right over good [Rawls, by Finlayson]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
A fair arrangement is one that parties can agree to without knowing how it will benefit them personally [Rawls, by Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Check your rationality by thinking of your opinion pronounced by the supreme court [Rawls]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism inappropriately scales up the individual willingness to make sacrifices [Rawls, by Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 4. Unfairness
The maximisation of happiness must be done fairly [Rawls, by Smart]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Rawls rejected cosmopolitanism because it doesn't respect the autonomy of 'peoples' [Rawls, by Shorten]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / a. Original position
The original position models the idea that citizens start as free and equal [Rawls, by Swift]
Why does the rational agreement of the 'Original Position' in Rawls make it right? [Nagel on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / b. Veil of ignorance
Choose justice principles in ignorance of your own social situation [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
All desirable social features should be equal, unless inequality favours the disadvantaged [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Power is only legitimate if it is reasonable for free equal citizens to endorse the constitution [Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarians lump persons together; Rawls somewhat separates them; Nozick wholly separates them [Swift on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Rawls's account of justice relies on conventional fairness, avoiding all moral controversy [Gray on Rawls]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / b. Against communitarianism
In a pluralist society we can't expect a community united around one conception of the good [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty Principle: everyone has an equal right to liberties, if compatible with others' liberties [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The social contract has problems with future generations, national boundaries, disabilities and animals [Rawls, by Nussbaum]
Justice concerns not natural distributions, or our born location, but what we do about them [Rawls]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / b. Justice in war
If an aggression is unjust, the constraints on how it is fought are much stricter [Rawls]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg]
Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg]
Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg]
It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg]