Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Bennett, Boethius and Ernst Zermelo

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55 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Predicative definitions are acceptable in mathematics if they distinguish objects, rather than creating them? [Zermelo, by Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
We take set theory as given, and retain everything valuable, while avoiding contradictions [Zermelo]
Set theory investigates number, order and function, showing logical foundations for mathematics [Zermelo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
ZFC: Existence, Extension, Specification, Pairing, Unions, Powers, Infinity, Choice [Zermelo, by Clegg]
Zermelo published his axioms in 1908, to secure a controversial proof [Zermelo, by Maddy]
Set theory can be reduced to a few definitions and seven independent axioms [Zermelo]
Zermelo made 'set' and 'member' undefined axioms [Zermelo, by Chihara]
For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set [Zermelo, by Blackburn]
Zermelo showed that the ZF axioms in 1930 were non-categorical [Zermelo, by Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Zermelo introduced Pairing in 1930, and it seems fairly obvious [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Replacement was added when some advanced theorems seemed to need it [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
Zermelo used Foundation to block paradox, but then decided that only Separation was needed [Zermelo, by Maddy]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / m. Axiom of Separation
The Axiom of Separation requires set generation up to one step back from contradiction [Zermelo, by Maddy]
Not every predicate has an extension, but Separation picks the members that satisfy a predicate [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 3. Antinomies
The antinomy of endless advance and of completion is resolved in well-ordered transfinite numbers [Zermelo]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
In ZF, the Burali-Forti Paradox proves that there is no set of all ordinals [Zermelo, by Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / e. Countable infinity
Zermelo realised that Choice would facilitate the sort of 'counting' Cantor needed [Zermelo, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
For Zermelo the successor of n is {n} (rather than n U {n}) [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Zermelo believed, and Von Neumann seemed to confirm, that numbers are sets [Zermelo, by Maddy]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Different versions of set theory result in different underlying structures for numbers [Zermelo, by Brown,JR]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
If universals are not separate, we can isolate them by abstraction [Boethius, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
We can call the quality of Plato 'Platonity', and say it is a quality which only he possesses [Boethius]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius]
Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
We should judge principles by the science, not science by some fixed principles [Zermelo]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God is the good [Boethius]
God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius]
If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius]