Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Bennett, George Boole and Alex Betteridge

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
Boole applied normal algebra to logic, aiming at an algebra of thought [Boole, by Devlin]
Boole's notation can represent syllogisms and propositional arguments, but not both at once [Boole, by Weiner]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Boole made logic more mathematical, with algebra, quantifiers and probability [Boole, by Friend]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Boole's method was axiomatic, achieving economy, plus multiple interpretations [Boole, by Potter]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Maybe each event has only one possible causal history [Bennett]
Maybe an event's time of occurrence is essential to it [Bennett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Understanding is needed for imagination, just as much as the other way around [Betteridge]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Delaying a fire doesn't cause it, but hastening it might [Bennett]
Either cause and effect are subsumed under a conditional because of properties, or it is counterfactual [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causes are between events ('the explosion') or between facts/states of affairs ('a bomb dropped') [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
The full counterfactual story asserts a series of events, because counterfactuals are not transitive [Bennett]
A counterfactual about an event implies something about the event's essence [Bennett]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Empty space is measurable in ways in which empty time necessarily is not [Bennett, by Shoemaker]