19 ideas
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
13831 | Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz] |
13827 | Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz] |
13825 | Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz] |
13823 | In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz] |
13826 | Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz] |
14375 | If structures result from intrinsic natures of properties, the 'relations' between them can drop out [Jacobs] |
14378 | Science aims at identifying the structure and nature of the powers that exist [Jacobs] |
12467 | Powers come from concrete particulars, not from the laws of nature [Jacobs] |
14377 | Possibilities are manifestations of some power, and impossibilies rest on no powers [Jacobs] |
14376 | States of affairs are only possible if some substance could initiate a causal chain to get there [Jacobs] |
14379 | Counterfactuals invite us to consider the powers picked out by the antecedent [Jacobs] |
14372 | Possible worlds are just not suitable truthmakers for modality [Jacobs] |
12466 | All modality is in the properties and relations of the actual world [Jacobs] |
14371 | We can base counterfactuals on powers, not possible worlds, and hence define necessity [Jacobs] |
12465 | Concrete worlds, unlike fictions, at least offer evidence of how the actual world could be [Jacobs] |
12464 | If some book described a possibe life for you, that isn't what makes such a life possible [Jacobs] |
12469 | Possible worlds semantics gives little insight into modality [Jacobs] |
22110 | Demonstration provides depth of understanding and explanation (rather than foundations) [Kretzmann/Stump] |