Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Dancy, C. Anthony Anderson and New Scientist writers

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133 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J]
If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.]
CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA]
We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J]
Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J]
For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J]
Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J]
Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J]
Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J]
I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J]
Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J]
You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 7. Intelligence
About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.]
People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J]
Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J]
Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J]
Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J]
Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.]
Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.]
Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.]
The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.]
Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.]
The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / b. Quarks
Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.]
Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.]
Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.]
The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.]
Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.]
The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.]
Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.]
The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.]
Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.]
Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.]
Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.]
Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.]
Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.]
Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.]
Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / g. Anti-matter
Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.]
String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.]
Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.]
String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.]
String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.]
String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.]
In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.]
The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.]
Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.]
Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 7. Black Holes
General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.]
Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.]
Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.]