135 ideas
2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
1887 | You cannot divide anything into many parts, because after the first division you are no longer dividing the original [Sext.Empiricus] |
22764 | Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus] |
17950 | The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas] |
17951 | A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas] |
22752 | Reasoning is impossible without a preconception [Sext.Empiricus] |
1885 | Proof moves from agreed premises to a non-evident inference [Sext.Empiricus] |
6021 | It is only when we say a proposition that we speak truly or falsely [Sext.Empiricus] |
2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
12196 | A valid hypothetical syllogism is 'that which does not begin with a truth and end with a falsehood' [Sext.Empiricus] |
6020 | 'Man is a rational mortal animal' is equivalent to 'if something is a man, that thing is a rational mortal animal' [Sext.Empiricus] |
1902 | Since Socrates either died when he was alive (a contradiction) or died when he was dead (meaningless), he didn't die [Sext.Empiricus] |
2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
17945 | Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas] |
17946 | Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas] |
22744 | Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus] |
22762 | Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus] |
17944 | 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas] |
2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
1889 | If an argument has an absurd conclusion, we should not assent to the absurdity, but avoid the absurd argument [Sext.Empiricus] |
2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
1871 | Whether honey is essentially sweet may be doubted, as it is a matter of judgement rather than appearance [Sext.Empiricus] |
2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
1883 | How can the intellect know if sensation is reliable if it doesn't directly see external objects? [Sext.Empiricus] |
2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
22748 | Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect [Sext.Empiricus] |
1890 | We distinguish ambiguities by seeing what is useful [Sext.Empiricus] |
2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
22759 | Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus] |
2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
20795 | Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light [Sext.Empiricus] |
2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
22760 | Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus] |
2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
1870 | The basis of scepticism is the claim that every proposition has an equal opposing proposition [Sext.Empiricus] |
1882 | The necks of doves appear different in colour depending on the angle of viewing [Sext.Empiricus] |
1881 | The same oar seems bent in water and straight when out of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
1872 | The same tower appears round from a distance, but square close at hand [Sext.Empiricus] |
1873 | If we press the side of an eyeball, objects appear a different shape [Sext.Empiricus] |
20794 | How can sceptics show there is no criterion? Weak without, contradiction with [Sext.Empiricus] |
2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
1874 | How can we judge between our impressions and those of other animals, when we ourselves are involved? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1878 | Water that seems lukewarm can seem very hot on inflamed skin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1880 | Some actions seem shameful when sober but not when drunk [Sext.Empiricus] |
1877 | If we had no hearing or sight, we would assume no sound or sight exists, so there may be unsensed qualities [Sext.Empiricus] |
1879 | Sickness is perfectly natural to the sick, so their natural perceptions should carry some weight [Sext.Empiricus] |
1876 | If we enjoy different things, presumably we receive different impressions [Sext.Empiricus] |
1911 | Even if all known nations agree on a practice, there may be unknown nations which disagree [Sext.Empiricus] |
1910 | With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but among Syrians it is considered noble [Sext.Empiricus] |
6026 | How can you investigate without some preconception of your object? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1886 | If you don't view every particular, you may miss the one which disproves your universal induction [Sext.Empiricus] |
2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
22746 | If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length [Sext.Empiricus] |
22741 | The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus] |
1884 | If we utter three steps of a logical argument, they never exist together [Sext.Empiricus] |
22763 | We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus] |
2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |
18681 | The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi] |
22754 | Saying the good is useful or choiceworth or happiness-creating is not the good, but a feature of it [Sext.Empiricus] |
22755 | Like a warming fire, what is good by nature should be good for everyone [Sext.Empiricus] |
22756 | If a desire is itself desirable, then we shouldn't desire it, as achieving it destroys it [Sext.Empiricus] |
6032 | Right actions, once done, are those with a reasonable justification [Sext.Empiricus] |
1517 | The tektraktys (1+2+3+4=10) is the 'fount of ever-flowing nature' [Sext.Empiricus] |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
1900 | If time and place are infinitely divided, it becomes impossible for movement ever to begin [Sext.Empiricus] |
1899 | Does the original self-mover push itself from behind, or pull itself from in front? [Sext.Empiricus] |
1901 | If all atoms, times and places are the same, everything should move with equal velocity [Sext.Empiricus] |
22747 | A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place [Sext.Empiricus] |
1903 | If motion and rest are abolished, so is time [Sext.Empiricus] |
1904 | Time must be unlimited, but past and present can't be non-existent, and can't be now, so time does not exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
22749 | Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true [Sext.Empiricus] |
22750 | Time is divisible, into past, present and future [Sext.Empiricus] |
1905 | How can time be divisible if we can't compare one length of time with another? [Sext.Empiricus] |
22742 | Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus] |
22751 | If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
22730 | All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good [Sext.Empiricus] |
1891 | How can we agree on the concept of God, unless we agree on his substance or form or place? [Sext.Empiricus] |
22739 | God must suffer to understand suffering [Sext.Empiricus] |
22738 | The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed [Sext.Empiricus] |
22734 | God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations [Sext.Empiricus] |
22736 | God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God [Sext.Empiricus] |
22740 | God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God [Sext.Empiricus] |
1892 | The existence of God can't be self-evident or everyone would have agreed on it, so it needs demonstration [Sext.Empiricus] |
22735 | The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause [Sext.Empiricus] |
22732 | The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind [Sext.Empiricus] |
22728 | Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions [Sext.Empiricus] |
22737 | An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God [Sext.Empiricus] |
22731 | It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods [Sext.Empiricus] |
1893 | If God foresaw evil he would presumably prevent it, and if he only foresees some things, why those things? [Sext.Empiricus] |