Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, Archelaus and H.H. Price

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25 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
14329 Some dispositional properties (such as mental ones) may have no categorical base [Price,HH]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9032 Before we can abstract from an instance of violet, we must first recognise it [Price,HH]
9035 If judgement of a characteristic is possible, that part of abstraction must be complete [Price,HH]
9034 There may be degrees of abstraction which allow recognition by signs, without full concepts [Price,HH]
9036 There is pre-verbal sign-based abstraction, as when ice actually looks cold [Price,HH]
9037 Intelligent behaviour, even in animals, has something abstract about it [Price,HH]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
9033 Recognition must precede the acquisition of basic concepts, so it is the fundamental intellectual process [Price,HH]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
10645 We reach concepts by clarification, or by definition, or by habitual experience [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
9030 Abstractions can be interpreted dispositionally, as the ability to recognise or imagine an item [Price,HH]
9029 If ideas have to be images, then abstract ideas become a paradoxical problem [Price,HH]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
10644 A 'felt familiarity' with universals is more primitive than abstraction [Price,HH]
10646 Our understanding of 'dog' or 'house' arises from a repeated experience of concomitances [Price,HH]
9031 The basic concepts of conceptual cognition are acquired by direct abstraction from instances [Price,HH]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
1748 Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
5989 Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]