Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, Carl Ginet and Albert Camus

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
9247 Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
6707 Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
9245 To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
9244 Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
8836 Must all justification be inferential? [Ginet]
8837 Inference cannot originate justification, it can only transfer it from premises to conclusion [Ginet]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
9249 Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
9253 The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
9250 Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
9252 The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
9251 One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
9243 If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus]
6708 Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
9242 Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus]
9246 Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
9248 It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus]