Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, Churchland / Churchland and Harold Noonan

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22 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
16014 It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
16024 I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
16023 Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
16016 Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
16017 Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
16015 Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
16020 Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16019 Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
16018 Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
7522 A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7521 It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands]
7523 The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands]