Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, Helen Cartwright and Albert Einstein

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21 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
10670 A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
7621 Special relativity, unlike general relativity, was operationalist in spirit [Putnam on Einstein]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
22955 Einstein took causation to be the bedrock of physics [Einstein, by Coveney/Highfield]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
20638 General relativity assumes laws of nature are the same in all frames of reference [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
20636 Newton is a special case of Einstein's general theory, with an infinite speed of light [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
21230 The theory is 'special' because it sticks to observers moving straight, at constant speeds [Einstein, by Farmelo]
21231 Assume the speed of light is constant for all observers, and the laws of physics are the same [Einstein, by Farmelo]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
20634 General Relativity says there is no absolute force or acceleration [Einstein, by Close]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
20648 Mass is a measure of energy content [Einstein]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
21232 Space-time arises from the connection between measurements of space and of time [Einstein, by Farmelo]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
7626 I do not believe in a personal God [Einstein]