Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, Ian McFetridge and Rita Carter

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

41 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
4913 Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
4910 Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R]
4911 The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
4919 There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
4908 No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
4902 Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R]
4904 Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R]
4915 In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
4917 Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
4916 There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
4905 Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
4918 In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
4912 Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
4903 Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
4920 Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
4906 Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
4909 The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
4914 A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
4907 The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R]