16 ideas
12801 | Coherentists seek relations among beliefs that are simple, conservative and explanatory [Foley] |
15382 | Paraconsistent reasoning can just mean responding sensibly to inconsistencies [Jago] |
19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
19261 | Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig] |
19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
19708 | Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid] |
19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
12800 | Externalists want to understand knowledge, Internalists want to understand justification [Foley] |
19730 | Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig] |
19731 | If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig] |
19732 | The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig] |
12802 | We aren't directly pragmatic about belief, but pragmatic about the deliberation which precedes it [Foley] |
12803 | Justification comes from acceptable procedures, given practical constraints [Foley] |
19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |