Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Jonathan Kvanvig, Richard Hooker and Gary Gutting

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16 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
21943 Since Kant, self-criticism has been part of philosophy [Gutting]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 4. Linguistic Structuralism
21944 Structuralism describes human phenomena in terms of unconscious structures [Gutting]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
19896 It is not a law if not endorsed by the public [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
19891 Rule of law is superior to autonomy, because citizens can see what is expected [Hooker,R]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
19897 Human laws must accord with the general laws of Nature [Hooker,R]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
17005 Natural things observe certain laws, and things cannot do otherwise if they retain their forms [Hooker,R]