17 ideas
| 12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
| 12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
| 17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
| 17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
| 8921 | Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman] |
| 8698 | Modal structuralism says mathematics studies possible structures, which may or may not be actualised [Hellman, by Friend] |
| 9557 | Statements of pure mathematics are elliptical for a sort of modal conditional [Hellman, by Chihara] |
| 10263 | Modal structuralism can only judge possibility by 'possible' models [Shapiro on Hellman] |
| 8922 | Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman] |
| 20752 | For man, being is not what he is, but what he is going to be [Ortega y Gassett] |
| 12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
| 12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
| 12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
| 12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
| 17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
| 12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
| 20756 | Instead of having a nature, man only has a history [Ortega y Gassett] |