61 ideas
| 5750 | Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia] |
| 5737 | Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia] |
| 5744 | First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia] |
| 5740 | Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia] |
| 5741 | If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia] |
| 5735 | Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia] |
| 5736 | No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia] |
| 5746 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia] |
| 5738 | We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia] |
| 5732 | 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia] |
| 5739 | Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia] |
| 5734 | Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia] |
| 5742 | In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia] |
| 5743 | If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia] |
| 5749 | Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia] |
| 5751 | The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia] |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| 5748 | We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia] |
| 21181 | Relativity and Quantum theory give very different accounts of forces [Hesketh] |
| 21183 | Thermodynamics introduced work and entropy, to understand steam engine efficiency [Hesketh] |
| 21191 | Photons are B and W° bosons, linked by the Higgs mechanism [Hesketh] |
| 21199 | Spinning electric charge produces magnetism, so all fermions are magnets [Hesketh] |
| 21189 | Electrons may have smaller components, bound by a new force [Hesketh] |
| 21180 | Electrons are fundamental and are not made of anything; they are properties without size [Hesketh] |
| 21182 | Quantum mechanics is our only theory, and is very precise, and repeatedly confirmed [Hesketh] |
| 21184 | Physics was rewritten to explain stable electron orbits [Hesketh] |
| 21187 | Virtual particles can't be measured, and can ignore the laws of physics [Hesketh] |
| 21185 | Colour charge is positive or negative, and also has red, green or blue direction [Hesketh] |
| 21194 | The Standard Model omits gravity, because there are no particles involved [Hesketh] |
| 21195 | In Supersymmetry the Standard Model simplifies at high energies [Hesketh] |
| 21197 | Standard Model forces are one- two- and three-dimensional [Hesketh] |
| 21188 | Quarks and leptons have a weak charge, for the weak force [Hesketh] |
| 21186 | Quarks rush wildly around in protons, restrained by the gluons [Hesketh] |
| 21192 | Neutrinos only interact with the weak force, but decays produce them in huge numbers [Hesketh] |
| 21196 | To combine the forces, they must all be the same strength at some point [Hesketh] |
| 21190 | 'Space' in physics just means location [Hesketh] |
| 21193 | The universe is 68% dark energy, 27% dark matter, 5% regular matter [Hesketh] |
| 21198 | If a cosmic theory relies a great deal on fine-tuning basic values, it is probably wrong [Hesketh] |