39 ideas
| 8797 | The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 18767 | Free logics has terms that do not designate real things, and even empty domains [Anderson,CA] |
| 18763 | Basic variables in second-order logic are taken to range over subsets of the individuals [Anderson,CA] |
| 18771 | Stop calling ∃ the 'existential' quantifier, read it as 'there is...', and range over all entities [Anderson,CA] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 18769 | Do mathematicians use 'existence' differently when they say some entity exists? [Anderson,CA] |
| 18770 | We can distinguish 'ontological' from 'existential' commitment, for different kinds of being [Anderson,CA] |
| 18768 | We cannot pick out a thing and deny its existence, but we can say a concept doesn't correspond [Anderson,CA] |
| 18766 | 's is non-existent' cannot be said if 's' does not designate [Anderson,CA] |
| 18765 | Individuation was a problem for medievals, then Leibniz, then Frege, then Wittgenstein (somewhat) [Anderson,CA] |
| 8443 | Mereological essentialism says an entity must have exactly those parts [Sosa] |
| 13267 | Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki] |
| 16209 | How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson] |
| 18764 | The notion of 'property' is unclear for a logical version of the Identity of Indiscernibles [Anderson,CA] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8794 | There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8796 | A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa] |
| 8799 | If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa] |
| 8795 | Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8798 | Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa] |
| 4058 | Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson] |
| 4062 | No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson] |
| 4059 | It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson] |
| 4057 | A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson] |
| 4695 | Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot] |
| 4696 | The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson] |
| 4060 | The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson] |
| 4061 | The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson] |
| 8442 | What law would explain causation in the case of causing a table to come into existence? [Sosa] |
| 8445 | The necessitated is not always a result or consequence of the necessitator [Sosa] |
| 8444 | Where is the necessary causation in the three people being tall making everybody tall? [Sosa] |