Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Judith (Jarvis) Thomson, Jaakko Hintikka and M.R. Ayers

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27 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
15785 Our commitments are to an 'ontology', but also to an 'ideology', or conceptual system [Hintikka]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
13267 Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki]
16209 How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15786 Commitment to possible worlds is part of our ideology, not part of our ontology [Hintikka]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
4058 Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson]
4062 No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson]
4059 It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson]
4057 A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson]
4695 Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot]
4696 The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson]
4060 The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson]
4061 The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson]