Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Judith (Jarvis) Thomson, Wallace, J and Francisco Surez

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29 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez]
A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez]
The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Only natural kinds and their members have real essences [Suárez, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki]
How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter]
Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter]
Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter]
Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter]
Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter]
Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson]
No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson]
It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson]
A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson]
Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot]
The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson]
The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson]
The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
The old 'influx' view of causation says it is a flow of accidental properties from A to B [Suárez, by Jolley]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez]