142 ideas
| 5278 | Philosophy is no more than abstractions concerning observations of human historical development [Marx/Engels] |
| 15390 | Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons] |
| 12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
| 4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
| 12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
| 12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
| 12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
| 12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
| 12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
| 12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
| 12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
| 12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons] |
| 12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
| 12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
| 12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
| 12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
| 12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
| 12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
| 12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
| 12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
| 12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
| 18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
| 12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
| 12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
| 12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
| 12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
| 12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
| 4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
| 4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
| 12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
| 12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
| 12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
| 12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
| 8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
| 8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
| 12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
| 12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
| 12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
| 12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
| 12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
| 8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
| 12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
| 12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
| 12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
| 12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
| 12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
| 12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
| 12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
| 5287 | Philosophical problems are resolved into empirical facts [Marx/Engels] |
| 14933 | Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross] |
| 18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
| 17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
| 12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
| 12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
| 12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
| 12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
| 12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
| 12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
| 12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
| 12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
| 12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
| 12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
| 12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
| 12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
| 12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
| 12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
| 12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
| 12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
| 12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
| 12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
| 12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
| 12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
| 12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
| 12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
| 12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
| 12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
| 12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
| 12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
| 5303 | For the proletariate, law, morality and religion are just expressions of bourgeois interests [Marx/Engels] |
| 4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
| 4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
| 4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
| 4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
| 4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
| 4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
| 4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
| 4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
| 4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
| 4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
| 4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
| 23872 | 'Society determines consciousness' is contradictory; society only exists in minds [Weil on Marx/Engels] |
| 5277 | Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [Marx/Engels] |
| 4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
| 18883 | Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons] |
| 18884 | Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons] |
| 5280 | Language co-exists with consciousness, and makes it social [Marx/Engels] |
| 12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
| 12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |
| 5281 | Consciousness is a social product [Marx/Engels] |
| 5276 | The nature of an individual coincides with what they produce and how they produce it [Marx/Engels] |
| 21998 | Bourgeois interests create our morality, law and religion [Marx/Engels] |
| 4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
| 5289 | When aristocracy or the bourgeoisie dominate, certain values dominate with them [Marx/Engels] |
| 5274 | Young Hegelians proposed changing our present consciousness for liberating critical consciousness [Marx/Engels] |
| 21992 | Producing their own subsistence distinguishes men from animals [Marx/Engels] |
| 5275 | Men distinguish themselves from animals when they begin to produce their means of subsistence [Marx/Engels] |
| 5292 | Individuals are mutually hostile unless they group together in competition with other groups [Marx/Engels] |
| 5293 | Only in community are people able to cultivate their gifts, and therefore be free [Marx/Engels] |
| 5273 | Young Hegelians think consciousness is chains for men, where old Hegelians think it the bond of society [Marx/Engels] |
| 5282 | If the common interest imposes on the individual, his actions become alienated and enslaving [Marx/Engels] |
| 5283 | In communist society we are not trapped in one activity, but can act freely [Marx/Engels] |
| 5288 | The class controlling material production also controls mental production [Marx/Engels] |
| 5290 | The revolutionary class is opposed to 'class', and represents all of society [Marx/Engels] |
| 5294 | To assert themselves as individuals, the proletarians must overthrow the State [Marx/Engels] |
| 5302 | Modern governments are just bourgeois management committees [Marx/Engels] |
| 5304 | Communism aims to abolish not all property, but bourgeois property [Marx/Engels] |
| 5307 | Many of the bourgeois rights grievances are a form of self-defence [Marx/Engels] |
| 5285 | Slavery cannot be abolished without the steam-engine [Marx/Engels] |
| 5284 | Communism abolishes private property and dissolves the powerful world market [Marx/Engels] |
| 5306 | The free development of each should be the condition for the free development of all [Marx/Engels] |
| 5291 | The law says private property is the result of the general will [Marx/Engels] |
| 5305 | Communists want to rescue education from the ruling class [Marx/Engels] |
| 5279 | Human history must always be studied in relation to industry and exchange [Marx/Engels] |
| 5286 | Most historians are trapped in the illusions of their own epoch [Marx/Engels] |
| 5301 | The history of all existing society is the history of class struggles [Marx/Engels] |
| 4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
| 4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
| 4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
| 4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
| 4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
| 4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
| 4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
| 4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
| 4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
| 4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
| 4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
| 4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
| 4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
| 4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
| 4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
| 4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |