Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Karl Marx, Sydney Shoemaker and David S. Oderberg

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109 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophers have interpreted the world, but the point is to change it [Marx]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Whether human thinking can be 'true' must be decided in practice, not theory [Marx]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
People have had good reasons for thinking that the circle has been squared [Shoemaker]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg]
Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Inability to measure equality doesn't make all lengths unequal [Shoemaker]
We couldn't verify the earth's rotation if everyone simultaneously fell asleep [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker]
I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker]
Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis]
A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker]
'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker]
The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker]
Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker]
Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker]
If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker]
The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker]
Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker]
Shoemaker moved from properties as powers to properties bestowing powers [Shoemaker, by Mumford/Anjum]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / e. Substance critique
Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker]
Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 4. Potentiality
Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker]
Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker]
Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Maybe billions of changeless years have elapsed since my last meal [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker]
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker]
Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If memory is the sole criterion of identity, we ought to use it for other people too [Shoemaker]
Bodily identity is one criterion and memory another, for personal identity [Shoemaker, by PG]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 2. Self as Social Construct
The authentic self exists at the level of class, rather than the individual [Marx, by Dunt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The human essence is not found in individuals but in social relations [Marx]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Armies and businesses create moralities in which their activity can do no wrong [Marx, by Weil]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The real will of the cooperative will replace the 'will of the people' [Marx]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The middle class gain freedom through property, but workers can only free all of humanity [Marx, by Singer]
Theory is as much a part of a revolution as material force is [Marx]
In moving from capitalism to communism a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is needed [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / d. Liberal freedom
Liberal freedom is the right to be separate, and ignores the union of man with man [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Liberals want the right to be separate, rather than for people to be united [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Early Marx anticipates communitarian objections to liberalism [Marx, by Oksala]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Man is dominated by money, which is the essence of his alienation [Marx]
From each according to his ability, to each according to his need [Marx]
By saying the material dialectic of history aspires to the best, Marx agreed with capitalism [Weil on Marx]
False consciousness results from concealment by the superstructure [Marx, by Singer]
Marx says force is everything, and that the weak will become strong, while remaining the weak [Weil on Marx]
Must production determine superstructure, or could it be the other way round? [Singer on Marx]
Marx rejected equal rights because they never actually treat people as equals [Marx, by Kymlicka]
Even decently paid workers still have their produce bought with money stolen from them [Marx]
People who only have their labour power are the slaves of those permitting them to work [Marx]
Freedom only comes when labour is no longer necessary [Marx]
Freedom is making the state subordinate to its society [Marx]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 11. Capitalism
The handmill gives feudalism, the steam mill capitalism [Marx]
Capitalism changes the world, by socialising the idea of a commodity [Marx, by Bowie]
The essence of capitalism is the subordination of people to things [Marx, by Weil]
Marx thought capitalism was partly liberating, and could make labour and ownership more humane [Marx, by Bowie]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
Bourgeois 'freedom of conscience' just tolerates all sorts of religious intolerance [Marx]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Marxists say liberal rights are confrontational, and liberal equality is a sham [Marx, by Wolff,J]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
If things turn red for an hour and then explode, we wouldn't say the redness was the cause [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker]
If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
If three regions 'freeze' every three, four and five years, after sixty years everything stops for a year [Shoemaker, by Lowe]
If three regions freeze every 3rd, 4th and 5th year, they all freeze together every 60 years [Shoemaker]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is the opium of the people, and real happiness requires its abolition [Marx]
Religious feeling is social in origin [Marx]