Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Karl Popper, Earl Conee and Pindar

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22358 Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
11946 Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12177 Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
5451 Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
19520 Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19521 If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
19522 More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
19523 Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19555 People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
19557 Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee]
19556 Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee]
12890 That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
12892 Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22188 Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
18284 Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper]
7780 Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
16830 We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
6794 If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
6795 When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
3856 Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
7779 There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3860 Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
12176 Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
6017 Nomos is king [Pindar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12175 Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
12179 Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper]