Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Katherine Hawley, Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh and Thomas Hobbes

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159 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
Hobbes created English-language philosophy [Hobbes, by Tuck]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
Resolve a complex into simple elements, then reconstruct the complex by using them [Hobbes, by MacIntyre]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 3. Axioms of Mereology
A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Only supernatural means could annihilate anything once it had being [Hobbes]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / d. Humean supervenience
A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Every part of the universe is body, and non-body is not part of it [Hobbes]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley]
Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley]
Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes]
If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes]
If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley]
Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley]
Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley]
Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley]
If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley]
Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley]
The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley]
Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley]
Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley]
If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley]
Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley]
If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley]
Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley]
Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley]
An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley]
Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley]
Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes]
If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley]
Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes]
Appearance and reality can be separated by mirrors and echoes [Hobbes]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes]
Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 5. Dream Scepticism
Dreams must be false because they seem absurd, but dreams don't see waking as absurd [Hobbes]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary [Hobbes]
Freedom is absence of opposition to action; the idea of 'free will' is absurd [Hobbes]
A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes]
If a man suddenly develops an intention of doing something, the cause is out of his control, not in his will [Hobbes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 7. Compatibilism
Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity [Hobbes]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes]
Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes]
The 'simple passions' are appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief [Hobbes, by Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
The will is just the last appetite before action [Hobbes]
It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own [Hobbes, by Tuck]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Good and evil are what please us; goodness and badness the powers causing them [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Self-preservation is basic, and people judge differently about that, implying ethical relativism [Hobbes, by Tuck]
Men's natural desires are no sin, and neither are their actions, until law makes it so [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / c. Value of happiness
Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Hobbes wants a contract to found morality, but shared values are needed to make a contract [MacIntyre on Hobbes]
A contract is a mutual transfer of rights [Hobbes]
The person who performs first in a contract is said to 'merit' the return, and is owed it [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
For Hobbes the Golden Rule concerns not doing things, whereas Jesus encourages active love [Hobbes, by Flanagan]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
In the violent state of nature, the merest suspicion is enough to justify breaking a contract [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 4. Value of Authority
Suspicion will not destroy a contract, if there is a common power to enforce it [Hobbes]
Fear of sanctions is the only motive for acceptance of authority that Hobbes can think of [MacIntyre on Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
No one who admitted to not keeping contracts could ever be accepted as a citizen [Hobbes]
If there is a good reason for breaking a contract, the same reason should have stopped the making of it [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 7. Prisoner's Dilemma
The first performer in a contract is handing himself over to an enemy [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
Someone who keeps all his contracts when others are breaking them is making himself a prey to others [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtues are a means to peaceful, sociable and comfortable living [Hobbes]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Injustice is the failure to keep a contract, and justice is the constant will to give what is owed [Hobbes]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
In time of war the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short [Hobbes]
Hobbes attributed to savages the passions which arise in a law-bound society [Hobbes, by Rousseau]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / a. Sovereignty
Hobbes says the people voluntarily give up their sovereignty, in a contract with a ruler [Hobbes, by Oksala]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
There is not enough difference between people for one to claim more benefit than another [Hobbes]
Hobbes says people are roughly equal; Locke says there is no right to impose inequality [Hobbes, by Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 3. Alienating rights
If we seek peace and defend ourselves, we must compromise on our rights [Hobbes]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
We should obey the laws of nature, provided other people are also obeying them [Hobbes, by Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
The legal positivism of Hobbes said law is just formal or procedural [Hobbes, by Jolley]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Punishment should only be for reform or deterrence [Hobbes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / c. Combatants
I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
If fear of unknown powers is legal it is religion, if it is illegal it is superstition [Hobbes]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
Causation is only observation of similar events following each other, with nothing visible in between [Hobbes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The attributes of God just show our inability to conceive his nature [Hobbes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
Religion is built on ignorance and misinterpretation of what is unknown or frightening [Hobbes]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Belief in an afterlife is based on poorly founded gossip [Hobbes]