Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Keith Campbell, Jennifer Hornsby and H.A. Prichard

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
9254 In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 5. Action as Trying
20082 Bodily movements are not actions, which are really the tryings within bodily movement [Hornsby, by Stout,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
9261 The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
9262 The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
9256 I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
9257 The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
9260 Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
9259 We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
9255 Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
9258 If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]