29 ideas
| 14001 | People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian] |
| 13991 | Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian] |
| 7791 | The simplest of the logics based on possible worlds is Lewis's S5 [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
| 9358 | There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI] |
| 9357 | Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI] |
| 9364 | Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI] |
| 11002 | Equating necessity with informal provability is the S4 conception of necessity [Lewis,CI, by Read] |
| 9362 | Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI] |
| 7803 | Modal logic began with translation difficulties for 'If...then' [Lewis,CI, by Girle] |
| 14002 | Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian] |
| 9365 | We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI] |
| 21500 | We rely on memory for empirical beliefs because they mutually support one another [Lewis,CI] |
| 21501 | If we doubt memories we cannot assess our doubt, or what is being doubted [Lewis,CI] |
| 6556 | If anything is to be probable, then something must be certain [Lewis,CI] |
| 21498 | Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI] |
| 22352 | Out of more than a hundred planets, Earth is the only one with the idea of free will [Vonnegut] |
| 5828 | Extension is the class of things, intension is the correct definition of the thing, and intension determines extension [Lewis,CI] |
| 9361 | We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI] |
| 14000 | 'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian] |
| 9363 | Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI] |
| 13990 | Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian] |
| 13992 | Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian] |
| 13994 | Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian] |
| 13995 | Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian] |
| 13996 | Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian] |
| 13997 | Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian] |
| 13993 | Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian] |
| 13998 | Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian] |
| 13999 | People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian] |