Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for La Mettrie, Buddha (Siddhartha Gautama) and Michael Devitt

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27 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
Individuals don't exist, but are conventional names for sets of elements [Buddha]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
The Buddha believed the gods would eventually disappear, and Nirvana was much higher [Buddha, by Armstrong,K]
Life is suffering, from which only compassion, gentleness, truth and sobriety can save us [Buddha]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie]