Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for La Mettrie, Churchland / Churchland and Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E.

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22 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125 If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19120 Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124 A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
19126 If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129 The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130 KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 3. Privacy
7522 A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
7521 It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands]
7523 The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
7647 The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
7645 When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
23225 The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7652 Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
7650 All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
7651 With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
7648 The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
7646 There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
7649 There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie]