81 ideas
| 20186 | Unlike knowledge, wisdom cannot be misused [Zagzebski] |
| 19694 | Wisdom is the property of a person, not of their cognitive state [Zagzebski, by Whitcomb] |
| 11912 | Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar] |
| 20221 | Precision is only one of the virtues of a good definition [Zagzebski] |
| 11920 | A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar] |
| 20220 | Objection by counterexample is weak, because it only reveals inaccuracies in one theory [Zagzebski] |
| 11919 | Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar] |
| 11929 | The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar] |
| 11927 | Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar] |
| 11915 | If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar] |
| 11916 | 'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar] |
| 11956 | 'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar] |
| 11928 | Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar] |
| 11933 | A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar] |
| 11932 | Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar] |
| 11934 | The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar] |
| 11947 | Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar] |
| 11952 | The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar] |
| 11953 | Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar] |
| 11943 | Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar] |
| 11939 | If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar] |
| 11914 | Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar] |
| 11913 | For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar] |
| 11962 | Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar] |
| 11917 | Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar] |
| 11955 | There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar] |
| 11918 | The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar] |
| 11963 | What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar] |
| 20188 | Modern epistemology is too atomistic, and neglects understanding [Zagzebski] |
| 20223 | Epistemology is excessively atomic, by focusing on justification instead of understanding [Zagzebski] |
| 20217 | Truth is valuable, but someone knowing the truth is more valuable [Zagzebski] |
| 20191 | Some beliefs are fairly voluntary, and others are not at all so [Zagzebski] |
| 20222 | Knowledge either aims at a quantity of truths, or a quality of understanding of truths [Zagzebski] |
| 20225 | For internalists Gettier situations are where internally it is fine, but there is an external mishap [Zagzebski] |
| 20226 | Gettier problems are always possible if justification and truth are not closely linked [Zagzebski] |
| 20228 | We avoid the Gettier problem if the support for the belief entails its truth [Zagzebski] |
| 20227 | Gettier cases arise when good luck cancels out bad luck [Zagzebski] |
| 20194 | Intellectual virtues are forms of moral virtue [Zagzebski] |
| 20210 | A reliable process is no use without the virtues to make use of them [Zagzebski] |
| 20206 | Intellectual and moral prejudice are the same vice (and there are other examples) [Zagzebski] |
| 20208 | We can name at least thirteen intellectual vices [Zagzebski] |
| 20215 | A justified belief emulates the understanding and beliefs of an intellectually virtuous person [Zagzebski] |
| 20187 | Epistemic perfection for reliabilism is a truth-producing machine [Zagzebski] |
| 11951 | Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar] |
| 11936 | The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar] |
| 11935 | Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar] |
| 7647 | The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie] |
| 20218 | The self is known as much by its knowledge as by its action [Zagzebski] |
| 11944 | Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar] |
| 7645 | When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie] |
| 23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
| 7652 | Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie] |
| 20205 | The feeling accompanying curiosity is neither pleasant nor painful [Zagzebski] |
| 7650 | All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie] |
| 7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
| 20202 | Motives involve desires, but also how the desires connect to our aims [Zagzebski] |
| 20216 | Modern moral theory concerns settling conflicts, rather than human fulfilment [Zagzebski] |
| 20193 | Moral luck means our praise and blame may exceed our control or awareness [Zagzebski] |
| 20199 | Nowadays we doubt the Greek view that the flourishing of individuals and communities are linked [Zagzebski] |
| 20196 | Virtue theory is hopeless if there is no core of agreed universal virtues [Zagzebski] |
| 20200 | A virtue must always have a corresponding vice [Zagzebski] |
| 20201 | Eight marks distingush skills from virtues [Zagzebski, by PG] |
| 20203 | Virtues are deep acquired excellences of persons, which successfully attain desire ends [Zagzebski] |
| 20207 | Every moral virtue requires a degree of intelligence [Zagzebski] |
| 20214 | Virtue theory can have lots of rules, as long as they are grounded in virtues and in facts [Zagzebski] |
| 20213 | We need phronesis to coordinate our virtues [Zagzebski] |
| 20209 | For the virtue of honesty you must be careful with the truth, and not just speak truly [Zagzebski] |
| 20197 | The courage of an evil person is still a quality worth having [Zagzebski] |
| 7648 | The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie] |
| 11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
| 11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
| 11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
| 11959 | Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar] |
| 9448 | Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford] |
| 11930 | One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar] |
| 11957 | It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar] |
| 11921 | The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar] |
| 11931 | Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar] |
| 7646 | There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie] |
| 7649 | There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie] |