64 ideas
22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
23770 | Reductive analysis makes a concept clearer, by giving an alternative simpler set [Williams,NE] |
23769 | Promoting an ontology by its implied good metaphysic is an 'argument-by-display' [Williams,NE] |
22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
23783 | Change exists, it is causal, and it needs an explanation [Williams,NE] |
22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
23784 | Processes don't begin or end; they just change direction unexpectedly [Williams,NE] |
23790 | Processes are either strings of short unchanging states, or continuous and unreducible events [Williams,NE] |
23786 | The status quo is part of what exists, and so needs metaphysical explanation [Williams,NE] |
23768 | A metaphysic is a set of wider explanations derived from a basic ontology [Williams,NE] |
23773 | Humeans say properties are passive, possibility is vast, laws are descriptions, causation is weak [Williams,NE] |
23779 | We shouldn't posit the existence of anything we have a word for [Williams,NE] |
22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
23775 | Powers are 'multi-track' if they can produce a variety of manifestations [Williams,NE] |
23780 | Every possible state of affairs is written into its originating powers [Williams,NE] |
23789 | Naming powers is unwise, because that it usually done by a single manifestation [Williams,NE] |
23771 | Fundamental physics describes everything in terms of powers [Williams,NE] |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
23776 | Rather than pure powers or pure categoricals, I favour basics which are both at once [Williams,NE] |
23777 | Powers are more complicated than properties which are always on display [Williams,NE] |
23774 | There are basic powers, which underlie dispositions, potentialities, capacities etc [Williams,NE] |
23791 | Dispositions are just useful descriptions, which are explained by underlying powers [Williams,NE] |
22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
23772 | If objects are property bundles, the properties need combining powers [Williams,NE] |
22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
23788 | Four-Dimensional is Perdurantism (temporal parts), plus Eternalism [Williams,NE] |
22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
7647 | The imagination alone perceives all objects; it is the soul, playing all its roles [La Mettrie] |
7645 | When falling asleep, the soul becomes paralysed and weak, just like the body [La Mettrie] |
23225 | The soul's faculties depend on the brain, and are simply the brain's organisation [La Mettrie] |
7652 | Man is a machine, and there exists only one substance, diversely modified [La Mettrie] |
7650 | All thought is feeling, and rationality is the sensitive soul contemplating reasoning [La Mettrie] |
7651 | With wonderful new machines being made, a speaking machine no longer seems impossible [La Mettrie] |
7648 | The sun and rain weren't made for us; they sometimes burn us, or spoil our seeds [La Mettrie] |
23782 | Causation is the exercise of powers [Williams,NE] |
23785 | Causation needs to explain stasis, as well as change [Williams,NE] |
22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
23787 | If causes and effects overlap, that makes changes impossible [Williams,NE] |
22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
23778 | Powers contain lawlike features, pointing to possible future states [Williams,NE] |
22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |
7646 | There is no abrupt transition from man to animal; only language has opened a gap [La Mettrie] |
7649 | There is no clear idea of the soul, which should only refer to our thinking part [La Mettrie] |