39 ideas
7914 | To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld] |
14025 | The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM] |
14023 | The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM] |
14024 | Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM] |
22886 | The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon] |
22914 | An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon] |
14021 | Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM] |
7118 | La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre] |
7912 | Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld] |
7915 | Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld] |
7917 | Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld] |
7913 | Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld] |
7916 | True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld] |
9299 | We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld] |
22902 | Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon] |
22905 | Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon] |
22913 | The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon] |
22889 | We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon] |
14020 | 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM] |
14026 | Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM] |
22900 | How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon] |
22898 | What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon] |
14022 | The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM] |
22897 | The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon] |
22896 | The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon] |
22901 | The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon] |
22903 | The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon] |
22910 | To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon] |
22909 | We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon] |
22904 | The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon] |
22906 | The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon] |
22907 | It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon] |
22883 | It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon] |
22890 | We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon] |
22884 | The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon] |
22892 | Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon] |
22912 | Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon] |
22911 | At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon] |
22882 | We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon] |