36 ideas
| 4643 | The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4633 | You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4635 | Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4632 | 'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4631 | In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4638 | The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4640 | If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG] |
| 4647 | 'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4639 | Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4646 | Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4645 | 'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4582 | Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4644 | A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4584 | The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4583 | How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4634 | Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4637 | To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 4629 | Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl] |
| 22858 | There is collective action, where a trend is manifest, but is not attributable to individuals [Lukes] |
| 20327 | Modern attention has moved from the intrinsic properties of art to its relational properties [Lamarque/Olson] |
| 20326 | Early 20th cent attempts at defining art focused on significant form, intuition, expression, unity [Lamarque/Olson] |
| 20330 | The dualistic view says works of art are either abstract objects (types), or physical objects [Lamarque/Olson] |
| 22854 | Power is a capacity, which may never need to be exercised [Lukes] |
| 22850 | Hidden powers are the most effective [Lukes] |
| 22852 | The pluralist view says that power is restrained by group rivalry [Lukes] |
| 22855 | One-dimensionsal power is behaviour in observable conflicts of interests [Lukes] |
| 22856 | Political organisation brings some conflicts to the fore, and suppresses others [Lukes] |
| 22857 | The two-dimensional view of power recognises the importance of controlling the agenda [Lukes] |
| 22859 | Power can be exercised to determine a person's desires [Lukes] |
| 22863 | Power is the capacity of a social class to realise its interests [Lukes] |
| 22860 | The evidence for the exertion of power need not involve a grievance of the powerless [Lukes] |
| 22861 | Power is affecting a person in a way contrary to their interests [Lukes] |
| 21133 | Supreme power is getting people to have thoughts and desires chosen by you [Lukes] |
| 22851 | In the 1950s they said ideology is finished, and expertise takes over [Lukes] |
| 22862 | Liberals take people as they are, and take their preferences to be their interests [Lukes] |
| 22853 | Anyone who thinks capitalism can improve their lives is endorsing capitalism [Lukes] |