74 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
7950 | Philosophy tries to explain how the actual is possible, given that it seems impossible [Macdonald,C] |
7923 | 'Did it for the sake of x' doesn't involve a sake, so how can ontological commitments be inferred? [Macdonald,C] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
7933 | Don't assume that a thing has all the properties of its parts [Macdonald,C] |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
7944 | Reduce by bridge laws (plus property identities?), by elimination, or by reducing talk [Macdonald,C] |
7938 | Relational properties are clearly not essential to substances [Macdonald,C] |
7967 | Being taller is an external relation, but properties and substances have internal relations [Macdonald,C] |
7965 | Does the knowledge of each property require an infinity of accompanying knowledge? [Macdonald,C] |
7934 | Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C] |
7958 | Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C] |
7972 | Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C] |
7959 | How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C] |
7960 | Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C] |
7951 | Numerical sameness is explained by theories of identity, but what explains qualitative identity? [Macdonald,C] |
7964 | How can universals connect instances, if they are nothing like them? [Macdonald,C] |
7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
7955 | Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances [Macdonald,C] |
7961 | A 'thing' cannot be in two places at once, and two things cannot be in the same place at once [Macdonald,C] |
7926 | We 'individuate' kinds of object, and 'identify' particular specimens [Macdonald,C] |
7936 | Unlike bundles of properties, substances have an intrinsic unity [Macdonald,C] |
7930 | The bundle theory of substance implies the identity of indiscernibles [Macdonald,C] |
7932 | A phenomenalist cannot distinguish substance from attribute, so must accept the bundle view [Macdonald,C] |
7937 | When we ascribe a property to a substance, the bundle theory will make that a tautology [Macdonald,C] |
7939 | Substances persist through change, but the bundle theory says they can't [Macdonald,C] |
7940 | A substance might be a sequence of bundles, rather than a single bundle [Macdonald,C] |
7948 | A statue and its matter have different persistence conditions, so they are not identical [Macdonald,C] |
7929 | A substance is either a bundle of properties, or a bare substratum, or an essence [Macdonald,C] |
7941 | Each substance contains a non-property, which is its substratum or bare particular [Macdonald,C] |
7942 | The substratum theory explains the unity of substances, and their survival through change [Macdonald,C] |
7943 | A substratum has the quality of being bare, and they are useless because indiscernible [Macdonald,C] |
7927 | At different times Leibniz articulated three different versions of his so-called Law [Macdonald,C] |
7928 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is false, because it is not necessarily true [Macdonald,C] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
7947 | In continuity, what matters is not just the beginning and end states, but the process itself [Macdonald,C] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
22881 | Should we value environmental systems for human benefit, or for their own sake? [Hildebrand] |