73 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
18781 | Inconsistency doesn't prevent us reasoning about some system [Mares] |
18789 | Intuitionist logic looks best as natural deduction [Mares] |
18790 | Intuitionism as natural deduction has no rule for negation [Mares] |
18787 | Three-valued logic is useful for a theory of presupposition [Mares] |
18793 | Material implication (and classical logic) considers nothing but truth values for implications [Mares] |
18784 | In classical logic the connectives can be related elegantly, as in De Morgan's laws [Mares] |
18780 | Standard disjunction and negation force us to accept the principle of bivalence [Mares] |
18786 | Excluded middle standardly implies bivalence; attacks use non-contradiction, De M 3, or double negation [Mares] |
18782 | The connectives are studied either through model theory or through proof theory [Mares] |
18783 | Many-valued logics lack a natural deduction system [Mares] |
18792 | Situation semantics for logics: not possible worlds, but information in situations [Mares] |
18785 | Consistency is semantic, but non-contradiction is syntactic [Mares] |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
18788 | For intuitionists there are not numbers and sets, but processes of counting and collecting [Mares] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
22179 | Explanatory facts also predict, and predictive facts also explain [Hempel, by Okasha] |
21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
21507 | Scientific explanation aims at a unifying account of underlying structures and processes [Hempel] |
6755 | For Hempel, explanations are deductive-nomological or probabilistic-statistical [Hempel, by Bird] |
17083 | The covering-law model is for scientific explanation; historical explanation is quite different [Hempel] |
13052 | Hempel rejects causation as part of explanation [Hempel, by Salmon] |
8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
18791 | In 'situation semantics' our main concepts are abstracted from situations [Mares] |
17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |