77 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
10482 | The logic of ZF is classical first-order predicate logic with identity [Boolos] |
10492 | A few axioms of set theory 'force themselves on us', but most of them don't [Boolos] |
18192 | Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy] |
7785 | The use of plurals doesn't commit us to sets; there do not exist individuals and collections [Boolos] |
10485 | Naïve sets are inconsistent: there is no set for things that do not belong to themselves [Boolos] |
10484 | The iterative conception says sets are formed at stages; some are 'earlier', and must be formed first [Boolos] |
13547 | Limitation of Size is weak (Fs only collect is something the same size does) or strong (fewer Fs than objects) [Boolos, by Potter] |
10699 | Does a bowl of Cheerios contain all its sets and subsets? [Boolos] |
14249 | Boolos reinterprets second-order logic as plural logic [Boolos, by Oliver/Smiley] |
10830 | Second-order logic metatheory is set-theoretic, and second-order validity has set-theoretic problems [Boolos] |
10225 | Monadic second-order logic might be understood in terms of plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10736 | Boolos showed how plural quantifiers can interpret monadic second-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10780 | Any sentence of monadic second-order logic can be translated into plural first-order logic [Boolos, by Linnebo] |
10829 | A sentence can't be a truth of logic if it asserts the existence of certain sets [Boolos] |
10697 | Identity is clearly a logical concept, and greatly enhances predicate calculus [Boolos] |
10832 | '∀x x=x' only means 'everything is identical to itself' if the range of 'everything' is fixed [Boolos] |
13671 | Second-order quantifiers are just like plural quantifiers in ordinary language, with no extra ontology [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10267 | We should understand second-order existential quantifiers as plural quantifiers [Boolos, by Shapiro] |
10698 | Plural forms have no more ontological commitment than to first-order objects [Boolos] |
7806 | Boolos invented plural quantification [Boolos, by Benardete,JA] |
10834 | Weak completeness: if it is valid, it is provable. Strong: it is provable from a set of sentences [Boolos] |
13841 | Why should compactness be definitive of logic? [Boolos, by Hacking] |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
10491 | Infinite natural numbers is as obvious as infinite sentences in English [Boolos] |
10483 | Mathematics and science do not require very high orders of infinity [Boolos] |
10833 | Many concepts can only be expressed by second-order logic [Boolos] |
10490 | Mathematics isn't surprising, given that we experience many objects as abstract [Boolos] |
10700 | First- and second-order quantifiers are two ways of referring to the same things [Boolos] |
10488 | It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos] |
10487 | I am a fan of abstract objects, and confident of their existence [Boolos] |
10489 | We deal with abstract objects all the time: software, poems, mistakes, triangles.. [Boolos] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
7401 | Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck] |
5454 | Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo] |
8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
16560 | Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver] |
8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
8693 | An 'abstraction principle' says two things are identical if they are 'equivalent' in some respect [Boolos] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
3645 | To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo] |
19673 | Galileo mathematised movement, and revealed its invariable component - acceleration [Galileo, by Meillassoux] |