Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Leo Tolstoy, Francis Bacon and Gareth Evans

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 5. Metaphysics beyond Science
Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon]
Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans]
How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans]
A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe]
Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans]
Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis]
There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Only individual bodies exist [Bacon]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon]
There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco]
We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon]
Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon]
Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans]
The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
True works of art transmit completely new feelings [Tolstoy]
Art is when one man uses external signs to hand on his feelings to another man [Tolstoy]
The highest feelings of mankind can only be transmitted by art [Tolstoy]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
The purpose of art is to help mankind to evolve better, more socially beneficial feelings [Tolstoy]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
People estimate art according to their moral values [Tolstoy]
The upper classes put beauty first, and thus freed themselves from morality [Tolstoy]
We separate the concept of beauty from goodness, unlike the ancients [Tolstoy]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Stripped and passive matter is just a human invention [Bacon]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Even without religion, there are many guides to morality [Bacon]